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ABSTRACT

Journalist Walter Lippmann and philosopher John Dewey engaged in an extended
dialogue in the 1 920s regarding the condition and future of American democracy. In a
series of books and essays the two intellectuals confronted issues that have been debated
since the creation of the American republic and that remain contested today: how public
opinion is formed; the capacity of individual citizens to render judgments concerning
public affairs; the role that public opinion ought to play in formulating public policy; the
possibility of establishing a truly democratic community. This paper argues that the
issues Lippmann and Dewey addressed and the conclusions they reached are products of
their experiences during the Progressive Era, World War I, and the immediate post-war
era, but that they also reflect the characters of each man. While neither man was able to
fashion wholly satisfactory responses to the challenges of American political life, both
framed the issues in original and provocative terms that serve well in any contemporary
discussion of American democracy.
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Walter Lippmann, John Dewey,
and American Political Democracy

The ink on the Declaration of Independence was scarcely dry before many
of the revolutionary leaders began expressing doubts about the possibility
of realizing these high hopes . . . The American people seemed incapable of
the degree of virtue needed for republicanism . . . Too many were unwilling
to respect authority...By the early 19th century, America had already
emerged as the most egalitarian, most materialistic, most individualistic
society in Western history. In many respects this new democratic society
was the very opposite of the one the revolutionary leaders had envisaged.
Gordon Wood
The Radicalism of the American Revolution 1

In the 1 920's John Dewey and Walter Lippmann engaged in an extended dialogue
regarding the condition and future of American democracy. It was a debate that has been
called "an epic confrontation" and a "battle for America' s political mind." 2 The issues
that Dewey and Lippmann confronted were issues as old as the American republic. On
one side was John Dewey: the philosopher of democracy; a man who had faith in the
power of education to prepare citizens to become active participants in the democratic
process; an advocate of a method of scientific inquiry that was available to everyone;
champion of social j ustice. On the other side was Walter Lippmann: skeptical of the
capacity of the public to judiciously govern their lives; a believer in restricting decisions
regarding public affairs to a modem aristocracy of unusual intellect and of especial
1

Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 229-30.
Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide ofAmerican Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1995), 159.; John Patrick Diggins, "From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann's
Quest for the Foundation of Legitimacy," Political Theory 19, no. 4 ( 199 1): 533.

2
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virtue; an advocate of rule by those who possessed expertise; a searcher for bedrock
principles of social authority and legitimacy.
There was a curious arc to the relationship between Dewey and Lippmann. The
books Lippmann wrote during the years before World War I expressed views he would
later move beyond or disavow. But Dewey was impressed by the pragmatic approach and
bold energy with which Lippmann engaged the problems of the day. Lippmann became
managing editor of the New Republic when it began publishing in 1 9 14. Dewey became a
regular contributor and the journal served as Dewey' s principal medium for the
expression of his views on public affairs over the next twenty years. 3 Dewey found
himself caught up in the New Republic's and Lippmann' s enthusiasm for American entry
into the war in Europe and in a series of essays he enthusiastically advocated their
position. It was a decision he came to regret so deeply that "like a burnt child who
shunned the fire" as late as 1 939 Dewey was urging Americans to avoid a different war,
"no matter what."4 World War I also had a profound effect on Lippmann. He came away
disappointed in the peace negotiations and alarmed at the ease with which public opinion
was manipulated. In a series of articles and two books written in the first half of the
decade Lippmann expressed his doubts about the future of American democracy. Dewey
believed Lippmann had produced "the most effective indictment of democracy as
currently conceived ever penned." 5 In 1 926 Dewey took up the challenge and wrote his
only work of formal political philosophy. 6

3 Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell, 1991), 193.
4 Cushing Strout, "William James and the Tradition of American Philosophers," Partisan Review, March
2001, 58.; John Dewey, "No Matter What Happens - Stay Out," Common Sense 3 ( 1939).
5 John Dewey, "Public Opinion, " New Republic 30 ( 1922). Dewey: The Middle Works 13:337
6 Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 300.
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Dewey remained a committed pragmatist and believer in the democratic life the
remainder of his life. Lippmann' s thought evolved dramatically as time went on: "No
contemporary who read Lippmann' s early books and followed his career could have
predicted where his thinking would take him by mid-century."7 Once an enthusiastic
admirer, Dewey became a harsh critic.
Both men were of the Progressive Era, an age in which Americans still thought to
a great degree in terms of 1 9th century values : decentralization, competition, equality,
agrarian, small town. By 1 920, the contours of 20th century America were triumphant centralized, industrialized, secularized, and urbanized. 8 John Dewey and Walter
Lippmann were trying to resolve familiar and ancient i ssues, but their conversation was
sharpened in ways peculiar to the era in which it took place and by the people they were.
The Progressive Era is generally described as the years between the tum of the
twentieth century and the end of World War I. The decade before was a momentous
turning point in American history. In the 1 890s immigration from southern and eastern
Europe exploded, a consumer culture began to take shape, businesses consolidated,
political parties were dramatically realigned, and the United States took its place on the
international stage. 9 From 1 893 to 1 897, America suffered the most severe depression it
had experienced to that point. Populists formed their own political party. A
"phantasmagoric popular social threat" haunted the nation which was manifested in

7

Diggins, "From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann's Quest for the Foundation of Legitimacy,"
522.
8 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1958; reprint, 1 972. 1 6th), 43.
9 Richard L. McCormick, "Public Life in Industrial America, 1 877- 1 9 1 7," in The New American History,
ed. Eric Foner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1 997) , 1 1 7 .

Jesse B . Markay
Revised May 2007
Page 4 of 77
"twisted forms in the perceptions of the businessmen, statesmen, and intellectuals" 1 0 The
Progressive Era originated in these challenges to American life and the accompanying
sense of anxiety. Progressivism may have been, as Richard Hofstadter wrote, a
"remarkably good-natured effort" to achieve some measure of "self-reformation.'' 11 But
memories of the shock of the last decade of the nineteenth century were not far beneath
the "surface placidity" of the era. 12 The sense that at any moment things could come
undone pervades much of Dewey' s and Lippmann ' s writing from the pre-war period,
often on the same page they display the optimism of characteristic of the era.
Out of the Progressive Era came a number of reforms intended to more securely
bind society. A great deal of the effort was to Americanize immigrants arriving from
foreign lands, and to urbanize those relocating from American farms. The Progressives
sought to smooth the conflict between labor and capital. There were measures for
worker' s safety, child labor was restricted, cities began to clean up slums. Anti-trust laws
and business regulations were implemented, tariffs were lowered, postal delivery was
expanded, savings banks were established, municipal reforms were instituted.
Constitutional amendments in 1 9 1 3 authorized a federal income tax and established
direct election of senators. The process of Amendments for Prohibition and granting
women the vote had begun. As historian Richard L. McCormick has described the
Progressive era: "The formation of settlement houses, the fight for woman suffrage, the
physicians' campaign for public health, the legal establishment of racial segregation, the

1°

Charles Berquist, Labor and the Course ofAmerican Democracy: US History in Latin American
Perspective (New York: Verso, 1 996), 48.
1 1 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1 955), 5 .
1 2 "Surface placidity" in Henry F. May "The Rebellion of the Intellectuals, 1 9 1 2- 1 9 1 7 , " in Ideas, Faiths
,
and Feelings (New York: Oxford University Press , 1 983), 1 8 .
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restriction of immigration, and the regulation of business corporations (however
diversely) the drive of native, white, middle-class Americans to improve and control the
often frightening conditions of industrial life." 1 3
Identifying Progressive reforms is relatively uncontroversial, but characterizing a
Progressive "Movement" is more problematic. Historian Arthur Link claimed that
Progressivism was really a shifting alliance of "many progressive movements" composed
primarily of interest groups or classes "seeking greater political status and economic
security." Despite diversity and tensions among the movements, they shared a sense of
common ideals and mutual objectives. In Link' s estimation, Progressivism functioned
successfully during World War I and survived "in a crippled way" through the months
following the war. But inexorably it came apart. "The important fact about the
progressive coalition of 1 9 1 6," Link argued, "was not its strength but its weakness." 14
Peter Filene challenged the existence o f the movement at all i n "An Obituary for The
Progressive Movement" in which he pronounced that the movement "never existed." 1 5
There is one certainty regarding the historiography of the era: every historian of
the era has their own Progressives. Richard Hofstadter' s Progressives were "victims of
an upheaval in status . . . men who suffered . . . through the changed pattern in the
distribution of deference and power" that took place around the tum of the 20th century. 1 6
Jackson Lears argued that the Progressives were really "anti-modernists," deeply

1 3 McCormick, "Public Life in Industrial America, 1 877- 1 9 1 7 , " 1 26.
1 4 Arthur S . Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1 920's?" The American Historical
Review LXIV, no. 4 ( 1 959): 838.
15 Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary For "The Progressive Movement" , " American Quarterly 22, no. 1 ( 1 970).
See also Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," Reviews in American History 10, no. 4 ( 1982) .
1 6 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., 1 3 5 .
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ambivalent about progress. 17 James Kloppenberg' s Progressives were a generation of
radical pragmatic philosophers, searching for alternatives to the philosophic idealism of
the nineteenth century. 1 8 The Progressives of Daniel Rodgers were cosmopolitan
reformers inspired by Europeans social democrats. 19 For Elizabeth Sanders, politically
mobilized farmers from the south and west were actually responsible for Progressive
reform. They were the ones with enough political power to legislate reform when the
urban North and organized labor were unable get the legislation passed. 20 Robert
Johnston' s Portland Progressives were radical anti-capitalists. 2 1 Gabriel Kolko' s
Progressives were triumphant commercial interests who "operated on the assumption that
the general welfare of the community could best be served by satisfying the concrete
needs of business." 22 Casey Nelson Blake wondered if the Progressives suffered from an
"anxious spasm of middle-class nostalgia for a village culture." 23
Urban middle-class post-Victorians desperate to eliminate social divisions are
Michael McGerr' s Progressives. "The middle class had not only rejected longstanding
individualism; it had adopted a new 'creed, ' the will to use association and the state to
end class conflict and the other problems of industrial capitalism." 24 Theda Skocpol sees
17

Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation ofAmerican Culture 1 8801 920 (New York: Pantheon Books, 198 1 ) , xiii.
18
James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and
American Thought, 1 870-1 920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 986) .
1 9 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1998).
20 Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-191 7 (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 999) .
21 Robert D. Johnston, The Radical Middle Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of Capitalism in
Progressive Era Portland, Oregon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
22 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-Interpretation ofAmerican History, 1 900-1916
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1 963), 2-3.
23 Casey Nelson Blake, "The Lost World of Progressive Reform," Raritan (2005) : 1 5 3 .
24 Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall o f the Progressive Movement i n America,
1870-1920 (New York: Free Press, 2003), 68.
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the Progressives as reformers "infused with determination to root out 'corrupt' forms of
party patronage . . . As corruption was fought the 'public interest could quickly be
recognized, embodied in reform laws, and implemented by experts . . . " 25
Some of the historian ' s Progressives are direct contradictions of each other. Henry
May ' s Progressives believers in the "national credo" which had as its first article of faith
"the reality, certainty, and eternity of moral values. Words like truth, justice, patriotism,
unselfishness, and decency were used constantly, without embarrassment, and without
any suggestion that their meaning might be only of a time and place." 26 But Eric
Goldman saw things differently. The Progressives were moral relativists: "In the year of
Wilson ' s inaugural, Lippmann' s Preface to Politics, presented the first conscious allembracing relativism in the discussion of public affairs. It scorned all moral absolutes.
The book was received with great enthusiasm in Progressive circles." 27
As he described in The Search for Order, Robert Wiebe's Progressives were
members of a confident, educated "new middle class . . . newly self-conscious business
men" who sought to devise a world "derived from the regulative, hierarchical needs of
urban-industrial life." They sought "continuity in a world of endless change." 2 8 On the
other hand, in Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism, Morton White
identified a number of intellectuals - Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. , John Dewey, Thorstein

25

Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United
States (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1 992), 265.
26 Henry May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time 1 912-1917
(Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1 959; reprint, 1964), 9. See also Richard M. Abrams, "The Failure of
Progressivism," in The Shaping of Twentieth Century America, ed. Richard M. Abrams and Lawrence W.
Levine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1 97 1 ) , 2 1 1 .
27 Eric Frederick Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform, 25th
Anniversary ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1 977), 173.
28 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1 920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1 967), 1 74, xiv.
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Veblen and Charles Beard - as his Progressives. 29 They had in common the rejection of
the arid forms of nineteenth century. Historian David Hollinger has proposed that the
complex and sometimes contradictory nature of the Progressive Era (and Walter
Lippmann in particular) was best captured in the titles of Wiebe' s and White' s books: a
search for order and a revolt against formalism. 3 0 Those two impulses were very much in
evidence in Dewey and Lippmann, though for Lippmann, what had once been a revolt,
became a search for formal principles.
In 1 9 1 5 , Progressive political reformer Benjamin DeWitt described what he
thought the essence of Progressivism entailed: the removal of corruption from public life;
increasing popular participation in American politics; the "conviction that the functions
of government at present are too restricted and that they must be increased and extended
to relieve social and economic distress." 3 1 Given those elements, Henry May's
observation that Dewey ' s political thought "was inescapably rooted i n the Progressive
Era" rings true. 3 2
John Dewey was born in Burlington Vermont in 1 859. Dewey' s father, who had
been a quartermaster with a Vermont regiment in the Civil War, supported his family as a
grocer. His mother was a passionate, evangelical Christian who enquired often regarding
the state of her son ' s souls . He entered the University of Vermont at the age.of fifteen

29

Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947,
1 949, 1 957), 12.
30 David A. Hollinger, "Science and Anarchy: Walter Lippmann's Drift and Mastery," American Quarterly
29, no. 5 ( 1 977) : 475 .
3 1 Benjamin Parke DeWitt, The Progressive Movement: A Non-Partisan, Comprehensive Discussion of
Current Tendencies in American Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), 5 .
3 2 May, The End o fAmerican Innocence: A Study o f the First Years o f Our Own Time 1 912-1917, 148-49.

Jesse B . Markay
Revised May 2007
Page 9 of 77
where he studied philosophy and the new theory of evolution. He taught high school for a
year in Oil City, Pennsylvania where he decided to try to make a career of philosophy.
He returned to Vermont and wrote his first published article, "The Metaphysical
Assumptions of Materialism." Dewey began graduate work in philosophy at Johns
Hopkins in 1 882. There for a brief time he studied with Charles Peirce, one of the first to
hold to the principles of pragmatism. Dewey claimed that it was not until many years
later that he understood how important Peirce was to the development of American
philosophy. 33 Dewey began teaching at the University of Michigan in 1 884. He would
remain there for ten years except for one year at the University of Minnesota. He married
Alice Chipman in 1 886. Over the next 14 years they had six children, two of whom died
in this period. In 1 894 Dewey accepted a position at the University of Chicago, then only
in its second year. He became Chair of the Philosophy, Psychology, and Education
departments allowing him to pursue an interdisciplinary approach and cultivate ideas that
stressed the social dimensions of human behavior. He organized the Chicago Laboratory
School. While in Chicago he met Jane Addams who had a profound impact on Dewey' s
thought, particularly on his ideas about harmonizing society and overcoming social
divisions. She was a "radicalizing influence," teaching Dewey much about the politics of
the big city. 34 As biographer Alan Ryan noted:
Those of Dewey' s readers who think that Dewey was astonishingly nai"ve about
the workings of the political system and about the real causes of the irrationality
and inefficiency of most modem societies may be grateful that he had Jane
Addams to take him on guided tours of the red-light district and to teach him

33

John J . McDermott, "John Dewey: A B iographical S ketch," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. John
J. McDermott (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), xvii.
34 Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, 149.
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about the meat-packing factories and the insanitariness of the food that emerged
from the hideous place. 3 5
Dewey was at the peak of his intellectual powers during his years at Chicago. He
"lived for the next several decades on the philosophical resources he accumulated in
Chicago. " 3 6
Dewey developed the essential tenets of his philosophic pragmatism in those
years. Dewey rejected the central observations of traditional philosophy. He believed
that philosophy ought to deal with human problems, not problems concocted by
philosophers. He had no use for philosophical puzzles that presupposed dichotomies such
as percept/concept, reason/will, thought/purpose, intellect/emotion, appearance/reality,
experience/nature, belief/action, theory/practice, facts/values, and self/others. He believed
in a radical empiricism in which the experiencing subject and experienced object
constituted one integrated unit. Dewey thought it impossible to ever obtain certain and
unrevisable knowledge. He believed in a pluralism of experiences, values, and meanings.
He believed that human action can improve the human condition. The community was
central to Dewey. The individual was intrinsically constituted by and in her or his social
relations. In that way individual achievement was inextricably bound with the
development of community. The creation of a genuinely democratic community
depended on critical discourse and continual and open communication. Education was the
essential element for the development of community life. Lived experience was the
central precept of philosophic inquiry. A community based on inquiry would develop a

35
36

Ibid. , 1 5 1 .
Ibid., 1 54.
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culture that prized conscious experience. He had a firm faith in science, but by science,
Dewey meant the systematic application of practical wisdom. 37
Dewey left the University of Chicago in 1904 under unpleasant and largely
unexplained circumstances, but the final straw seemed to be the dismissal of Alice
Chipman Dewey as principal of the Laboratory School. Dewey and family left Chicago
for New York where Dewey became professor of philosophy at Columbia University and
lecturer at Teachers College. In New York he played a more active role in public affairs
than he had in Chicago.
His exposure to Hegel at Hopkins "left a permanent deposit" in his thinking
despite subsequent transformations in his philosophical outlook. 3 8 Particularly important
to Dewey' s mature philosophy were two of Hegel' s arguments. First, individuals could
never be isolated from their history, culture, or environment. Second was that Hegel ' s
thought satisfied, as Dewey explained, " a demand for unification that was doubtless an
intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subjectmatter could satisfy." Dewey's "demand for unification" formed a basis of his
pragmatism. In his brief and only attempt at autobiography, Dewey wrote in 1 930, "The
sense of divisions and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a
consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of i solation of self
from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression - or,

3 7 Charlene Haddock

Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1 996), 8 . , Casey Nelson Blake, Beloved Community: The Cultural Criticsm of
Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank , & Lewis Mumford (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina, 1 990), 86-88 .
3 8 John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," i n Contemporary American Philosophers, ed.
George Plimpton Adams and William Pepperell Montague (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 930)
(reprint Later Works 5 : 1 53), 1 5 3 .
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rather, they were an inward laceration." 39 Overcoming the "divisions and separations"
Dewey found in philosophic permeated his pragmatism and was at the core of his
political philosophy.
In 1 9 1 3 , when Walter Lippmann' s first book was published, Dewey was fifty four
years old and acknowledged as America' s foremost educator and philosopher.
Walter Lippmann was born in New York City in 1 889. 40 His father was a
successful investor and Lippmann was raised in comfort, traveling to Europe yearly with
his art-loving and collecting parents. John Morton Blum, historian and editor of
Lippmann' s correspondence, observed that even as a child Lippmann led an "ordered
life," which developed into a life-long sense of discipline, control and self-possession. 41
He attended private schools in New York City and in 1 906 entered Harvard with a class
that included John Reed, Heyward Broun and T. S. Eliot. While at Harvard, Lippmann
worked with the poor in Boston, founded the Harvard Socialist Club and wrote for
journals concerned with social j ustice.
An editorial Lippmann had written in 1908 caught the attention of William James
and so impressed the Harvard professor that James introduced himself to Lippmann and
asked him to tea. From that day on Lippmann visited with James weekly, confiding to his
mother that his first conversation with James was "the greatest thing that happened to me
in my college life." When James died Lippmann wrote, "I love James more than any very

39

Ibid., 154.

40 Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1 980), 2.
4 1 John Morton Blum, " Walter Lippmann and the Problem of Order," in Public Philosopher: Selected

Letters of Walter Lippmann, ed. John Morton Blum (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1 985), xi.
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great man I ever saw."42 James reinforced Lippmann' s sense of the importance of
experimentation, pluralism and action. Graham Wallas spent a year at Harvard as visiting
professor while Lippmann was a student. In 1 908 Wallas wrote Human Nature in Politics
in which he contended that politics, like human life, was essentially an irrational
phenomenon, a claim that Lippmann would take up in his first book. Wallas was so
impressed by Lippmann that he dedicated his 1 9 1 4 work, The Great Society, to his
former student.
Lippmann was also drawn to George Santayana, the Spanish philosopher who
taught at Harvard. 43 There were stark differences between James' s pragmatic pluralism
and Santayana's search for absolute moral values. Lippmann referred to James frequently
in his early works, but his later work bore Santayana' s imprint. 44 Santayana chose
Lippmann to be his teaching assistant and groomed him as his successor in Harvard ' s
philosophy department. 45 "In later years, Lippmann claimed it was Santayana who saved
him from becoming a pragmatist. Throughout his life, Lippmann sought an order in the
universe which the intellectual could articulate for a society uncertain of its goals." 46
Lippmann left Harvard after graduating in 1 9 1 0 and began writing for a Boston
newspaper. He left that position to work for renowned muckraking journalist Lincoln
42

Walter Lippmann, "An Open Mind: William James," in William James Remembered, ed. Linda Simon
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1 996), 253 .
43 James, Santayana, Wallas and Lincoln Steffens (and Dewey?) were among a number o f older men drawn
to Lippmann, as he was to them. Historian James Kloppenberg noted in this regard Lippmann's "ability to
ingratiate himself with older men who thought they saw in him a younger version of themselves."
Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American
Thought, 1870-1920, 490 fn. 43.; see also Ronald Steel, "Walter Lippmann," in Invisible Giants: Fifty
Americans Who Shaped the Nation but Missed the History Books, ed. Mark C. Carnes (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002) , 177.
4 4 Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, 2 1 .
45 Steel, "Walter Lippmann," 1 75 .
46 William E. Leuchtenburg, "Walter Lippmann's Drift and Mastery," in Drift and Mastery (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall , Inc, 1 96 1 ) , 2.
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Steffens at the magazine Everybody's. In 1 9 1 2 Lippmann joined the administration of
George Lunn, a socialist who had been elected mayor of Schenectady, New York.
Historian Melvyn Dubofsky has noted that, "socialism in this period had become
Americanized." One million votes were cast for Eugene V. Debs in the 1 9 1 2 presidential
election. In the years from 1 9 1 0 to 1 9 1 2 socialist mayors were elected in Madison,
Berkeley, Scranton, Bridgeport, Butte and Schenectady. 47 Lippmann was attracted to
socialism out of distaste for the haphazard disorganized way society operated, rather than
out of concern for the wretched of the earth. 48 Lippmann left Lunn' s administration after
four months, disillusioned with the prospects of establishing a socialist haven in the idylls
of Schenectady. He returned to New York City where a publisher friend urged Lippmann
to write a book about politics. Lippmann retired to the woods of Maine to write his first
book. His purpose was to diagnose public disaffection from the political process. To a
great extent it was an aberration, because it was the only book he would write in which he
proposed unleashing human energy, rather than finding means to harness it.
A Preface to Politics was published within months of the presidential election of
1 9 1 2 in which Democrat Woodrow Wilson was victorious. It was a "remarkable"
election in which Theodore Roosevelt, running on the Progressive Party ticket, received
three million votes and Debs received another one million votes.49 Despite the significant
number of votes cast for third party candidates, the total number of voters declined from
the 1 908 election, continuing a trend that had begun in 1 896. Participation in presidential

47

Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (New York:
Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1 969; reprint, 1 973), 1 3 .
48 Steel, "Walter Lippmann, " 1 7 7 .
4 9 Alan Dawley, Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1 99 1 ) , 1 37 .
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elections had dropped precipitously since 1896 when approximately 80% of those
eligible voted. In the 1 9 1 2 election only 58% of those eligible chose to participate. 5 0
Lippmann argued in A Preface to Politics that politics had an "unreal connection
to actual conditions."5 1 The failure of political institutions to address the real concerns of
the American public was the source of public apathy toward politics. That failure was
also responsible for corruption in business and government, the bete noir of progressives.
Alternatives to formal government ("the real, but invisible governments") thrived
because they stepped into the breach between state and public. 52 Parties, political
machines, trade unions, political and social clubs, and powerful corporate interests
operated independent of legal restrictions. 5 3 The "thought processes in Washington were
too lumbering for the needs of the nation" and the government had become largely
irrelevant. 54
"Routineers" dominated American politics, politicians who lacked imagination
and simply and blindly followed precedent. "They imitate the old-fashioned thing their
grandfather did, and ignore the originality which enabled him to do it."55 The category
was not limited to conservatives. Good government advocates were only searching for
easier ways of doing things; "tinkering reformers" were still routineers. Nor were radicals
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University of Michigan Press), 23 .
5 2 Ibid., 20.
5 3 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 28.
55 Ibid., 10.

Jesse B . Markay
Revised May 2007
Page 16 of 77
much better; they sought only to impose new kinds of routines. 56 Even progressive
reform appeared to Lippmann as monotonous, trivial and irrelevant.
Routineers tried to eliminate evil by outlawing it, by devising modem "taboos" in
the guise of laws. This was a fundamental theme of A Preface to Politics. Lippmann
believed Freud, particularly his theories regarding sublimation, could help explain
politics ' inability to satisfy human desire. 57 Instead of ignoring emotional responses, or
trying to outlaw them, Lippmann argued that politics needed to redirect them towards
socially beneficial ends. Legislating against conduct merely created the kind of neurotic
behavior Freud believed came from repressing human impulses. Politics, wrote
Lippmann, would always be irrelevant to the public ' s business "if the only method it
knows is to ostracize the desires it cannot manage."58 Lippmann particularly admired
Jane Addams for her treatment of human foibles without oppressive moralizing. 59
Historian Charles Forcey observed that there were others who had made this kind
of argument without the "penumbra of semi-scientific jargon." Graham Wallas had done
so in 1 908 in his Human Nature in Politics.

60

Twenty years before, sociologist Lester

Ward had attacked legislation for being more concerned with preventing crime than for
preparing citizens for constructive work. In 1907, another sociologist, Edward A. Ross,
had argued along similar lines in Sin and Society.

61

Lippmann railed against anti-trust

laws, arguing that trusts were the result of greed, a natural human trait. Simply outlawing
56

Ibid. , 12.
took notice of A Preface to Politics and referred to it as the first practical attempt to apply his
psychology to politics. See Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Wey!, Lippmann, and the
Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 1 ) , 1 09.
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trusts would never work; a claim that had also been made by progressive authors Walter
Weyl and Herbert Croly. "For Lippmann as for Croly and Weyl the example of
government 'repression' most frequently cited was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act."62
William James, in his 1 9 1 0 essay "The Moral Equivalent of War," had also pursued this
theme: "Military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their place among our
ideals until better substitutes were offered."6 3
The first step towards creating a new political order would be to discard "the
futile hopes of mechanical perfection so consistently blasted by natural facts" so that we
might harness "human power for human purposes . . . political power to the nation' s
needs."64 The founders and drafters of the American Constitution "had a rather pale god,
they had only a speaking acquaintance with humanity, so they put their faith in a scaffold,
and it has been part of our natural piety to pretend that they succeeded." 65 Mechanical
politics denatured politics by removing personality, an effort that "ran against the grain of
living forces, the result is a deceptive theory of politics." 66 Politics ought to encourage
creativity, but when it became purely mechanical it ceased to engage the real energy of
the nation. Disappointment in government resulted from its failure to perform to
expectations, the result of representatives being "trained to interpret a constitution,
instead of a life . . . they worship man and distrust men"67
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Lippmann advocated development of specialized expertise to reorient the political
process. In familiar Progressive fashion he believed experts could improve working
conditions, prisons, child care, vocational guidance, and education. Experts could help
Americans break out of "the ruts" they were in. 6 8 There was a role for art: "Art enlarges
experience by admitting us to the inner life of others."69 While he argued that
concentration of economic power was not always a problem, the state had the
responsibility to develop creative means to intelligently direct the trusts rather than
allowing them to "run wild."7

0

Apparent in A Preface to Politics was Lippmann ' s admiration for John Dewey
and his pragmatic philosophy. It was a sentiment Lippmann expressed in essays and
reviews published in the New Republic in 1 9 1 5 and 1 9 1 6. Dewey's Democracy and
Education was a "great book," one "rich in the wisdom which democracies need." Dewey
possessed the "most powerful intellect devoted to the future·of American civilization."
He had done what creative thinkers must do; he had "extracted a philosophy out of the
possibilities which exist in our world."7 1
Lippmann applauded Dewey's call for philosophy designed to meet the needs and
purposes of men and women. Heretofore, Lippmann wrote, philosophy' s claim was that it
"determined us; we conformed to it." But the greatest value of Dewey' s work in
Lippmann ' s eyes was the frank recognition that philosophy had always been the product
of particular people at particular times, "a human being' s adjustment of his desires to his
limitations." Lippmann understood Dewey to be saying that philosophy was a projection
68

Ibid. , 56.
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of the "very soul" of the philosopher, an autobiographical statement of sorts. "Let us
continue to write autobiographies," Lippmann wrote, "but let us be sure that we know
they are autobiographies." Dewey had urged that philosophers should put away the
"illusions of divinity with which they s.hrouded their work. That pretentiousness is the
enemy. It turns human thoughts into monstrous absolutes, and takes the impossible
position that some of man ' s thoughts are too sacred for man ' s criticism."72 David
Hollinger has observed that Lippmann ' s early work was a "vehicle for preci sely the
combination of hopes and aspirations found in the classic texts of the pragmatist
philosophers."7 3
Sounding much like the pragmatic Dewey, Lippmann, in A Preface to Politics,
declined to outline hard and fast policies because to do so "inverts the whole order of
things" and created "theoretical tangles and pseudo-problems." 74 He proclaimed that "no
axiom can ever be a substitute for what really makes life worth living . . . each man in his
inward life is a last judgment on all his values." That is, "the goal of action is in its final
analysis aesthetic and not moral - a quality of feeling instead of conformity to rule."75
Words like "justice, harmony, power, democracy," he wrote, "are simply empirical
suggestions which may produce the good life." But modern men and women were under
no obligation to adhere to traditional standards, "we should be idolatrous fools to do
so."76 In Lippmann' s "revolt against formali sm," he wrote, "If only men kept their minds

72 Walter Lippmann,

"The Footnote," in Early Writings (New York: Liveright, 1 970), 307 - 1 0.
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History 67, no. 1 ( 1 980) : 103.
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76 Ibid.
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"freed from formalism, idol worship, fixed ideas and exalted abstractions man ' s
experience becomes the center o f thought."77
The type of statesman Lippmann envisioned would be one who regarded all social
organizations as an instrument. "Systems, institutions and mechanical contrivances have
for him no virtue of their own: they are valuable only when they serve the purposes of
men. He uses them, of course, but with a constant sense that men have made them, that
new ones can be devised."78 It was the willing, deliberate, conscious individual who
ought, in Lippmann' s view, to be at the center of the system. There was a need for men
(and they were always men to Lippmann, though he frequently noted the inequity of
excluding women from political and social power) who were "aggressively active
towards the world which gives man a miraculous assurance that the world is something
he can make."79
There were those, including his mentor Graham Wallas, who were troubled by
Lippmann' s apparent conviction that man ' s irrational impulses were stronger than reason.
As Charles Forcey observed, what Lippmann seemed to be looking for was a leader
creative and imaginative enough "who could save the class fro� its own stupidity." 80
Walter Leuchtenburg noted, "Lippmann' s celebration of the autonomous untrammeled
will ran the peril of embracing an outright anti-intellectualism." 8 1 Lippmann soon
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disavowed the celebration of "irrational impulsive humanism" on display in A Preface to
Politics. 8 2
There is a considerable shift from the concerns Lippmann described in A Preface
to Politics to those revealed in the book he completed eighteen months later, Drift and
Mastery. Lippmann was now less concerned with unleashing the dormant energy of the
American public than he was with harnessing that energy. He was troubled by the
potential for anarchic frenzy "against the chaos of a new freedom." 8 3 He was concerned
about a public thrown into confusion, unable to cope with the freedom that came from
escaping the restraints of tradition. Only a civic minded elite, it seemed, could save the
public from themselves.
Traditional forms of authority had been overthrown:
We inherit freedom and have to use it. The sanctity of property, the patriarchal
family, hereditary caste, the dogma of sin, obedience to authority - the rock of
ages, in brief, has been blasted for us. Those who are young today are born into a
world in which the foundations of the older order survive only as habits or by
default. 84
The problem then, as Lippmann saw it, was that "we don' t know how to behave
when personal contact and eternal authority have disappeared . . . we have changed our
environment more quickly than we know how to change ourselves." 85 The very
perception of impermanence was daunting in itself. Churches were empty, not because of
indifference on the part of the parishioners, but because of their intellectual failure to deal
with the sudden change in civilization. The public was disillusioned by the judicial
82 Merle Eugene Curti, Human Nature in American Thought: A History (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1 980), 355.
83 Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (New York: Mitchell
Kennerley, 1 9 14); (reprint, 1985. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 1 7 .
84 Ibid. , 1 5 .
85 Ibid . , 92.
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system. "It is the bad sociology of judges and their class prejudices that are destroying the
prestige of the bench." 86 Traditional political units were poorly suited for the age; unions,
boards of trade, cooperative societies acted as "little governments" instead. "The world i s
so complex," Lippmann wrote, "that no official government can b e devised to deal with
it." 87 America stood at a time of unprecedented change, nostalgic for its past, naively
optimistic about its future, unable to master the present. "We have lost authority. We are
'emancipated' from an ordered world. We drift." 88
Americans were particularly uneasy about the power of business and they looked
to government to buffer them from unbridled economic power. 89 The public had
concluded that "private commercialism is an antiquated, feeble, mean, and unimaginative
way of dealing with the possibilities of modern industry."90 The size of economic units
needed to be addressed by the "new science of administration" rather than mechanically
restricting economic size. Lippmann supposed that government would eventually take
over ownership of railroads and then steel, oil, lumber and coal, "private property will
melt away . " But there isn't any sense in Drift and Mastery that this was something to be
hoped for because a more just society would result. Lippmann' s complaint was that
private property was an inefficient way to organize things. The solution to problems of
the American economy were purely technical, a matter only of combining popular control
with administrative power. 91
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What thwarted the growth of American civilization, Lippmann observed, was the
"murky vision of what we grandiloquently call the 'will of the people."' 92 This was an
i ssue that Lippmann and Dewey would return to later in the 20s. Questions regarding the
identification of the "public interest" generally turn on determining what the "interest" is.
But for both Lippmann and Dewey, the first step was to identify the "public." In Drift
and Mastery Lippmann argued that there were in fact multiple American publics, each of
them being held back by their failure to recognize the potential for power within them.
Consumers constituted one public, though their complete independence was doubtful,
something that Thorstein Veblen had argued. 93 In any event, Lippmann claimed that
granting women the vote would increase the political power of consumers enormously:
"The mass of women do not look at the world as do workers; in America at least their
prime interest is as consumers. They have more time for politics than men, and it is no
idle speculation to say that their influence will make the consumer the real master of the
political situation."94 Woman, as producers, constituted another public, one with growing
influence. The rights too longed denied to women would not be withheld much longer,
"in fact, they will be forced upon millions of women who never trouble to ask for any of
92
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these rights." What was uncertain was the form this life, replete with new freedom, would
take. "Each step in the woman ' s movement is creative. There are no precedents whatever,
not even bad ones. "95 Lippmann acknowledged the work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman in
promoting alternatives to "housekeeping arrangements inherited from the early
Egyptians."96 Lippmann predicted a number of things would be done collectively:
The idea of having forty kitchens, forty furnaces, forty laundries, and forty useless
backyards in one square block, managed by forty separate and overworked
women, each going helplessly to market, each bringing up children by rule of
thumb, -- all that is a kind of individualism which the world will get away from. 97

Labor was another public. Lippmann asserted that unions were currently
obstructionist, but without unions, industrial democracy was impossible and "without
democracy in industry . . . there is no democracy in America." 9 8 The real peril to America,
he argued, was the existence of "great masses of unorganized and perhaps unorganizable
workers."99 In the end, "the hopes of democracy are bound up with the labor
movement." '00
Lippmann proposed a litany of solutions for the problems of publics adrift
without providing any methods of implementation, something he would deride in the 20s.
Industry had to be reformed through education. A survey of American natural resources
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had to be undertaken. The railroads had to serve the development of our natural
resources. Waste and graft had to be eliminated. Vast sums of money had to be found to
implement methods to humanize labor. A new class of properly educated business men
had to be created. The banking system had to be revamped so as to provide credit at the
lowest possible costs. Methods of integrated the worker as an essential part of his
industry had to be found. Unions had to recognize their responsibility for more than the
narrow interests of their members to become "understanding directing partners of
business." For some industries, public ownership had to be undertaken, for others,
cooperative societies had to be developed. A variety of consumer protections had to be
administered. The consumer had to be made more discriminating; he had to "civilize his
desires." 1 01 Lippmann recognized the uncertainties of the modem age as a "thousand
terrors." Only when "society is intelligent enough to make destitution impossible" and
guaranteed a minimum of security for everyone could there be progress. "Social
hesitancy will disappear. . . every issue will not be fought as if life depended upon it, and
mankind will have emerged from a fear economy." Lippmann argued that change had to
be a "matter of invention and deliberate experience."

102

We can no longer treat life as something that has trickled down to us. We have to
deal with it deliberately, devise its social organization, alter its tools, formulate its
method, educate and control it. In endless ways we put intention where custom
has reigned. We break up routines, make decision, choose our ends, select
means. 1 03

As historian David Hollinger has observed, the "mastery" Lippmann was
proposing to utilize to overcome the "drift" of modem life was the discipline of
IOI
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science. 1 04 Lippmann had his own idea about what science was. It was a method and
spirit rather than a fixed body of knowledge. The intersubjectivity of science meant that
from the same set of facts, men and women would come to the same conclusions; it
would provide the discipline and passion necessary to unite and inspire disparate
civilizations. Because of advancements in science, "Lippmann encouraged people to
believe they would be organized, efficient, functional and under firm control without
sacrificing impulse, choice, fantasy, and liberty." 1 05 The difference between A Preface to
Politics and Drift and Mastery is that in the latter the emphasi s is on "firm control."
Dewey was in complete agreement with Lippmann about America adrift. His
support for entry into World War I was predicated on the hope that war would shock
Americans out of their complacency. He believed that science: directed, conscious,
reflective inquiry was the key to the problems of American democracy. But the science
that Lippmann advocated was more akin to managerial expertise than it was to the sort of
science that John Dewey extolled. "Dewey was confident that since the method of
experimental science and the processes of democracy were basically congenial, even
parallel, democracy' s more realistic hopes lay in science . . . yet science remained the
property of a limited technology." 1 06 That was the problem in Dewey' s mind, that science
was available to only a portion of society. It did not have to be that way. Dewey' s science
was available to everyone; that was the purpose of education. Dewey' s contemporary,
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William English Walling wrote this of Dewey, "If Dewey expects science to guide us,
this does not mean that he expects scientists to guide us." 107
In Drift and Mastery Lippmann wrote, "Democracy in politics is the twin brother
of scientific thinking . . . the scientific spirit is the discipline, the escape from drift, the
outlook of a free man." 1 08 This was a portent of things to come in Lippmann' s developing
thought. Science could be possessed by only a few. But if science belonged to the
experts, who owned democracy? Dewey had a very different idea. As David Marcell
observed, Dewey insisted that "science had to be democratized and democracy made
scientific before true progress could be assured . . . Progress was the cornerstone of the
entire range of John Dewey' s thought." 109 Historian John Recchuiti, writing about the
development of social science in the Progressive Era wrote, "This unresolved tension
between science as elitist enterprise and science as democratizing force was a formative
and unresolved paradox ." 1 1 0
The first issue of the New Republic was published in 1 9 14. Willard and Dorothy
Whitney Straight provided the finances. 1 1 1 Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Walter
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Lippmann were the editors. 1 1 2 They described the magazines mission in terms that were
congenial with Dewey' s views regarding the participation of public intellectuals in
guiding public opinion and Dewey contributed the first of some 1 60 of his essays the New
Republic would publish over the years. When the Lusitania was attacked in May 1 9 1 5 ,
Walter Lippmann and the New Republic began advocating preparedness for the
possibility that the United States would be drawn into the war. Their sympathies were
clear: the Lusitania "having united Engli shmen and Americans in a common grief and a
common indignation," might ultimately "unite them in a common war and a common
destiny." 1 13 Soon after, Dewey began to express his own sentiment in favor of preparing
for war.
By 1 9 1 5 Dewey was assailing German philosophy, arguing that German
romanticism and a fixation on philosophic dualisms produced Germany' s militarism and
belligerence. 1 14 Dewey made it clear that he believed German aggression would not end
on its own and that Americans ought to be prepared for war. From the early 191h century,
the course of German history could be reduced to the thought of one man, Immanuel
Kant. German exaltation of the state, something Dewey found repulsive, was a climax of
the "line of moral regeneration which took its start from Kant." Moral duty became
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equated with political subservience; moral obligation merged into political obedience;
rational thought overwhelmed by emotion. 1 15
In the summer of 1 9 1 6 Dewey began writing a series of essays published in the
New Republic, the Atlantic Monthly, and Seven Arts extolling the benefits that would
accrue with America' s entry into the war. The first pieces were ostensibly concerned with
education, but in a deeper sense they were oriented towards an analysis of the process of
social integration. He displayed an enthusiasm for war that had little to do with the direct
aims of any war-making effort. Dewey spiritedly predicted that war would provoke a
reassessment of the America educational system. 1 16 He recognized proposals for
universal military service that would assimilate immigrants and develop within them a
sense of public responsibility, a very Progressive sort of program. Though he did not hold
out any hope that a program compelling service would be successful, he was gratified
that there had been an awakening to the fact that immigrants remained as alienated from
the general society as they were on the day they arrived in America. 1 17
As biographer Alan Ryan has noted, "Dewey' s communitarianism is more than
communitarianism of the neighborhood. He was a benign, mild, and good-natured
nationalist, but he was a nationalist." 1 1 8 Dewey argued that the possibility of war had
"forced men out of narrow sectionalisms into a larger social unit," though he warned of
nationalism purchased through appeals to fears, suspicions, jealousies and latent hatreds.
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But, surprisingly, he argued that America' s exceptional history militated against the rise
of aggressive nationalism. Even America' s nationalism would be exceptional, "our unity
cannot be a homogenous thing" as was Europe' s . American nationalism would be based
on intelligence and scientific planning; it would not take social organization for granted.
War would mean that the "melting pot" would be transformed into a "symphony." 1 19 War
would create the conditions in which "hyphenism" would be welcomed "in the sense of
extracting from each people its special good . . . The point is to see that the hyphen
connects instead of separates." To develop the "symphony," the American educational
system would need to be "nationalized in a way which recognizes that the peculiarity of
our

nationalism is its intemationalism." 1 20
By late 1 9 16 , Dewey was sure that war was coming:
We can hardly welcome the war merely because it has made us think, and has
made us realize how many of the things we called thoughts were asylums for
laziness. But since the war has come, we may welcome whatever revelations of
our stupidity and carelessness it brings with it, and set about the institution of a
more manly and more responsible faith in progress than that in which we indulged
in the past. 121

War would force Americans to make a reassessment of th�ir fundamental beliefs, most
importantly the idea that progress was inevitable. "Even a great and devastating war," he
wrote, "is not too great a price to pay for an awakening from such an infantile and selfish
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Randolph Bourne, "Trans-National America," The Atlantic 1 1 8 ( 19 1 6) .
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dream. Progress is not automatic; it depends upon human intent and aim and upon
acceptance of responsibility for its production." 122
The United States entered the war in April 19 17, but as historian David Kennedy
has observed, "Americans went to war in 1 9 1 7 not only against Germans in the field of
France but against each other at home." 123 Dewey refused to believe that America' s entry
into the war was the cause of increasingly frequent outbreaks of violence against
German-Americans and those who opposed entry: "Much of the violence of current
intolerance is unconscious testimony that the diverse ingredients of our population are
not, after all, so integrated as we desire." 1 24 Dewey retained his faith that intolerance
coincident with war would be expunged by the reorganization war would foster. But by
late 1 9 1 7 Dewey was forced to confront the unanticipated consequences of war. Congress
had passed sweeping laws dealing with espionage, sedition and trading with the enemy.
These laws made it possible that virtually any criticism of the Wilson Administration
could be ruled illegal. 1 25 Dewey argued that those who made irresponsible accusations
against people they disagreed with were themselves culpable of disloyalty and sedition.
"I do not think to defeat Prussianism abroad it is necessary to establish Prussianism at
home." 1 26
In 1 9 1 5 , Randolph Bourne then an admiring student wrote of Dewey, "Professor
Dewey has given us a whole new language of meaning. After reading him, you can see

1 22 Ibid. : 238.
1 23 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford, 1 980),
41.
124
John Dewey, "In Explanation of Our Lapse," New Republic 1 3 ( 1 9 1 7 ) : 294.
1 25 Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny : A History of Modern American Reform, 1 96.
126
John Dewey, "Democracy and Loyalty in the Schools," New York Post, December 1 9, 1 9 1 7 .
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nothing again in the old terms." 1 27 Just two years later, Bourne reacted in horror as
Dewey stridently advocated American entry into World War I:
What I come to is a sense of suddenly being left in the lurch, of suddenly finding
that a philosophy upon which I had relied to carry us through no longer
works . . . Professor Dewey and his friends felt that the forces were too strong for
them, that the war had to be, and it was better to take it up intelligently than to
drift blindly in . . . If the war is too strong for you to prevent, how is it going to be
weak enough for you to mold it to your liberal purposes. 1 28

"The crowning failure of progressivism,'' wrote historian Richard Abrams, "was
the American role in World War I. . . The failure in progressivism lies not in the decision
to intervene but in the futility of intervention measured by progressive expectations." 1 29 It
was not Dewey' s finest hour and it ought to be acknowledged as such. Dewey was swept
up in enthusiasm for war in a way that seemed incomprehensible to many of his admirers.
To his credit, Dewey' s struggle with the realities of war and the rise of hyper-patriotism
at home led to his reassessment of j ust what war meant. War is the means towards some
end, but that end is always destruction. There may be, there are occasions when
destruction is warranted. Destruction then becomes the means to some other end, just as
Dewey taught in countless other situations. But he wasn' t clearheaded enough to see it in
1 9 1 5. Maybe that says less about John Dewey then it says about war itself.
Lippmann was also terribly disappointed about the course of the war. Lippmann
had come to the attention of Colonel Edward House, Woodrow Wilson ' s closest advisor,
through the New Republic's editorial stance and Lippmann' s The Stakes of Diplomacy

1 27

Randolph Bourne, "John Dewey's Philosophy," New Republic, March 1 3 , 1 9 1 5 , 5 .
Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," in The World of Randolph Bourne, ed. Lillian Schlissel (New
York: Dutton, 1 965), 1 3 1 .
1 29 Abrams, "The Failure of Progressivism," 223.
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( 1 9 1 5), his first book concerning foreign policy. 1 30 On American entry into the war,
House facilitated Lippmann' s appointment to a secret team known as the Inquiry. The
task of the Inquiry was plan for post-war Europe. Lippmann was also responsible for a
great deal of President Wilson ' s Fourteen Points. In the spring of 1 9 1 8 Lippmann went
to London to conduct intelligence and arrange for the dissemination of propaganda.
Lippmann was profoundly impressed by how easily public opinion could be molded.
Disillusioned by the course of negotiations in Paris after the war, Lippmann returned to
the United States. 1 3

1

The war for democracy had been won. "The American people began the war with
a single purpose - to defeat German," wrote historian William E. Leuchtenburg, "but
during the next few months they were promised a millennium, and when the ultimate
disenchantment followed, they turned away from the idea of world responsibility." 1 32
Wilson, seeing himself as the only spokesman for those who really wanted peace, had
gone to Paris to negotiate the peace. His greatest victory came when the Peace
Conference incorporated the League of Nations into the peace treaty. But Wilson was
unable to rouse enough support to overcome the opposition of senate Republicans and the
United States never joined the League. In the midst of his campaign for the League,

1 30 Walter Lippmann, The Stakes ofDiplomacy (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1 9 1 5 ) . One of the
criticisms of Lippmann was that he never settled on a consistent political philosophy. But to a remarkable
degree (with the not insignificant period before WWI) Lippmann's ideas regarding foreign policy remained
very similar to those he expressed in 1 9 1 5 . For a discussion of Lippmann's inconsistent political theory see
Benj amin Wright, 5 Public Philosophies of Walter Lippmann (Austin: University of Texas, 1 973 ) .
1 3 1 Steel, "Walter Lippmann," 1 78 .
1 3 2 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1 91 4-1932, 47.
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Wilson suffered a stroke. The country was ruled by "a regency headed by his wife" from
October 1 9 1 9 to March 1 92 1 . 1 33
World War I marked the first time large scale governmental control of the
American economy was attempted. Business leaders and public administrators worked
together to manage the economy and the inescapable conclusion was that it worked. 1 34
The amalgamation of government agencies that managed the wartime economy during
World War I served as models for similar efforts during the New Deal and World War
II. 1 3 5 The success of the war effort seemed to prove that an efficient state had developed
in the Progressive Era, employing the kind of intelligent control that both Lippmann and
Dewey had advocated. But those promising activities "all stopped with breathtaking
speed after the Armistice on November 1 1 , 1 9 18." 1 36 The decision to terminate almost
all of the federal administrative programs rested with Wilson, who from the beginning of
the war had been concerned with those programs, not because he believed war would
militarize the nation, but because he feared it would "corporatize it." 1 37
In 1 9 1 9 a series of dramatic strikes broke out. Police struck in Boston,
steelworkers and coal miners walked off the job and serious questions about the ultimate
loyalties of worker were raised. In the spring of 1 9 1 9 violence erupted across the country.
In June bombs exploded in eight cities in an apparently coordinated attack. By autumn,
millions of Americans believed revolution was imminent. In November 1 9 1 9, Attorney

1 33 Ibid., 6 1 .
1 34 Ibid. , 40.
1 3 5 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Vintage
Books, 1 995), 1 7 7 .
1 36
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General Mitchell, initiated raids on purported anarchists and radicals. Agents invaded
private homes, union headquarters, and meeting halls. Many were arrested, few were
convicted, some were deported. By the end of 1 920, the Red Scare was over.
Americans were tired of Progressive reformers, demands for selflessness and selfsacrifice. The war, the League of Nations debate, the Red Scare all seemed to be an
extension of the "political intensity" of the Progressive era and America had had
enough. 1 3 8 The economy was on the upswing; there was a general sense of material
1
content, life was "infused with benevolent materialism." 39 Instead of Progressive reform,
the middle class was finding fulfillment in the "flowering of American enterprise." 140
"What happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1 920' s?" asked historian Arthur
Link. 141 Link claimed that Progressivism was really a shifting alliance of "many
progressive movements." Central to Link' s argument was his contention that the
disintegration of Progressivism was hastened by the absence of any effective leadership.
In particular, Pi:ogressivism' s intellectual heroes abandoned the movement after World
War I. Without identifying those he was indicting, Link went so far as to argue that
"more than a simple desertion was involved here; it was often a matter of a cynical
repudiation of the ideals from which progressivism derived its strength." 142
For whatever reason, "Progressivism of the Twenties," wrote historian Eric Goldman,
"was a beaten army, muscles aching, its ranks seriously depleted." 143

1 3 8 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932, 8 1 .
1 39 Ibid., 8 .
1 40 Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1 920's? . "
1 4 1 Ibid.
1 42 Ibid.: 844.
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The presidential election of 1 920 was a "national disavowal" of the ideas for
which Wilson stood. "We have tom up Wilsonism by the roots," said Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge. Warren Harding, who had been chosen by Republican Party professionals,
won the election by capitalizing on feelings of nostalgia for the years before the war,
without demanding that any sacrifices be made. 144 Politics no longer demanded the
public' s attention as it once had. Voter turnout continued to fall to less than fifty percent
in 1 920. 1 45 Harding was not equipped to be president and his administration was a
succession of scandals. He died in August 1 923 and Calvin Coolidge became president.
Coolidge came along at the right time for a nation disgusted by the revelations of the
Harding administration. Coolidge "summoned up images of the democracy of New
England town meeting." 1 46 He served the needs of big business and the Old Guard of the
Republican Party better than even Harding had. "Never before, here or anywhere else,"
wrote the Wall Street Journal, "has a government so completely fused with
govemment." 1 47
One year after the Armistice, Walter Lippmann took the opportunity to assess
America' s condition. His essay in the New Republic set the stage for his dialogue with
Dewey. America was once again drifting. American leaders were too "absent-minded to
behave like a government." Labor unrest and the fear of an "imaginary revolution"

1 44
1 45

Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1 914-1932, 88.
Eric Foner, The Story ofAmerican Freedom (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1 998), 1 5 1 . Foner
includes the enfranchisement of women by the 1 9th Amendment as one of the reasons for the decline,
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( 1 982).
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gripped Americans in "hallucination." 148 Freedom of speech and of the press was in
danger and it wasn' t j ust the public at large guilty of "this grotesque performance."
Universities, the Congress, every government department, every newspaper office were
"stocked with men who are in mortal terror." America was in a panic because its leaders
had not developed policy to organize the nation after the war; even more egregious was
the failure of the press. The public was left imagining facts because the press was
performing so poorly. "The news system being what it is, and education being where it is,
it is possible to fool most of the public a good part of the time." Still, Lippmann had hope
in the public, at least that portion of it that "with all their limitations, are looking for the
truth." 1 49
Lippmann' s Liberty and the News was published in 1 920. It is the first of the texts
that constitute the dialogue between Dewey and Lippmann. In 1 922, Lippmann ' s Public
Opinion appeared and in 1 925 its sequel, The Phantom Public was published. Taken
together, they constitute what historian Christopher Lasch called the "most sobering
assessment of the American public ' s incapacity for critical judgment and selfgovernment" ever written. 150
John Dewey reviewed Public Opinion and The Phantom Public praising both for
their analysis of the problems in American democracy. Public Opinion, he wrote, was a
work that made an "inestimable contribution" to the practice of American politics.
Dewey was even more impressed by The Phantom Public than he had been by Public

1 48 Walter Lippmann, " Unrest, " The New Republic, November 12, 1 9 1 9, 3 1 8- 1 9 .
1 49 Ibid., 3 1 9.
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Opinion. 151 While he praised Lippmann ' s diagnosis, he expressed doubts about the cure
l)e proposed. In January 1 926, John Dewey presented a series of lectures at Kenyon
College in which he addressed the issues raised by Lippmann. The Public and Its
Problems, published in 1 927, was based on those talks. Dewey noted Lippmann' s
contribution: "To [The Phantom Public] as well as to his Public Opinion, I wish to
acknowledge my indebtedness . . . for ideas involved in my entire discussion even when it
reaches conclusion diverging from his." 152 As historian and philosopher James Gouinlock
has written, "The Public and Its Problems is the culmination of Dewey' s
instrumentalism . . . a proposal for the actual realization of intelligent conduct in practical
life." 15 3
In the course of their dialogue, both men displayed the essential elements of their
philosophic make-up. Lippmann: republican, skeptical, with a constricted view of the
capacity of the public. Dewey: democrat, pragmatic, expansive about the promise of
democracy. Also evident was the character they had developed as young men. Dewey,
sensitive to "the inward laceration," sought some way to create a democratic community.
Lippmann, searching for order, tried to provide an accurate assessment of democracy ' s
limitations.
"So long," Lippmann wrote in Liberty and the News ( 1 920), "as there is
interposed between the ordinary citizen and the facts a news organization determining by
entirely private and unexamined standards, no matter how lofty, what he shall know, and

1 5 1 John Dewey, "Practical Democracy, " New Republic 45 ( 1925): 2 13-20.
1 52John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems ( 1927); (reprint, 1954. Athens Ohio: Swallow Press/Ohio
University Press), fn 1 16- 17.
1 53 James Gouinlock, "Introduction," in John Dewey: The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois UP, 1984), xxiii.
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hence what he shall believe, no one will be able to say that the substance of democratic
government is secure." 1 54 What made that predicament particularly dangerous was that
journalists were "confused." American newspapermen acted under the theory that "an
abstraction like the truth and a grace like fairness must be sacrificed whenever anyone
thinks the necessities of civilization require the sacrifice." 1 55 Lippmann ' s point was that
reporters had decided what the national interest was and they were willing to shape the
news to promote that cause. They did this notwithstanding the fact that they were
"critically aware" that their conception of the national interest was "special to their age,
their locality, their interests, and their limited knowledge." 156 Given both the economic
and professional limitations of the practice of journalism, news "comes [to us] helterskelter." That would be fine for a baseball score, a transatlantic flight, or the death of a
monarch. But where the story is more complex, "as for example, in the matter of a
success of a policy or the social conditions among a foreign people - where the real
answer i s neither yes or no, but subtle and a matter of balanced evidence," then
journalism "causes no end of derangement, misunderstanding and even
misinterpretation." 157
Two years later Lippmann had decided that journalism, as defective as it was, was
not entirely to blame for the problems of American democracy. He had come to
understand that there was a critical problem in the way citizens absorbed information.
Lippmann had learned that in wartime symbolic imagery dominated life. It was a time
when "fear, pungency, and hatred have secured complete dominion of the spirit" and an
154 Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1 920), 1 0.
1 55 Ibid., 1 2 .
1 5 6 Ibid.
1 57 Ibid., 38-4 1 .
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entire population had but one picture of the enemy and of themselves. His alarm
originated in the ease with which public opinion could be manipulated. Lippmann was
certain that only by understanding what people thought they knew about events would it
be possible to understand why they acted the way they did. Actions originated in
irrational beliefs, on violent and instinctive responses to facts colored by creative
imaginations. People responded as energetically to fiction as they did to reality.
Citizens were not in any real sense in direct contact with their environment.
Between man and his environment stood a "pseudo-environment" composed partly of
fictions and partly of representations made by man himself from incomplete information
("the pictures in our heads"). The actual environment was "too big, too complex, and too
fleeting for direct acquaintance." Lippmann was concerned with the "spectacle of men
acting upon their environment moved by stimuli from their pseudo-environments." Since
man ' s behavior occurs in the real world, acting on the basis of stimuli from the pseudoenvironment was certain to lead to surprise and disappointment, one of Lippmann' s
perpetual concems. 158
To make sense of events, men and women utilized "stereotypes" to organize their
worlds. Lippmann argued that the public was able to see only a small portion of what
went on in the world, though opinions covered more territory than could be directly
observed. "The facts we see depend on where we are placed and the habits of our eyes."
He recognized John Dewey' s insight in his How We Think ( 1 9 10) for the proposition that
in order to deal with the world we needed to introduce definiteness and distinction,
consistency and stability before we could make sense of the world. "We define first and
1 5 8 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1 922), 14-16.
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then see." 1 59 Stereotypes came from moral codes and social philosophies. The process of
Americanization, for instance, was the substitution of American stereotypes for European
stereotypes. 1 60 Recognizable signs from our environment were chosen and filled in using
a stocks of images. There was economy in this, since to see all things new and fresh
would be exhausting. Understanding that preconceptions governed the way the world was
perceived would bring positive benefits :
If our philosophy tells us that each man is only a small part of the world, that his
intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects in a coarse net of ideas, then,
when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are stereotypes, to hold
them lightly, to modify them gladly. We tend, also, to realize more and more
clearly when our ideas started, how they came to us, why we accepted them. All
useful history is antiseptic in this fashion. It enables us to know what fairy tale,
what school book, what tradition, what novel, play, picture, phrase, planted one
preconception in this mind, another in that mind. 161
Stereotypes were not "instinctive equipment," but were socially constructed. The
failure to apprehend that distinction led to confusion and to the fabrication of "collective
minds, national souls, and race psychology." They acted as a defense of the status quo,
and challenges to them seemed like "attacks on the foundation of the universe." 162
Stereotypes existed prior to reason, imposing a certain character on perceptions before
data was analyzed by intelligence. 1 63 Patterns of stereotypes determined what facts were
seen and what was seen in them. Only by recognizing that opinions rested on "partial
expression seen through our stereotypes" would America ever become tolerant of those
who did not see the world as we did. 1 64

1 59 Ibid., 80-8 1 .
1 60 Ibid., 85.
1 6 1 Ibid., 90-9 1 .
162 Ibid., 95 .
1 63 Ibid., 98.
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One of the foremost American stereotypes in Lippmann' s scheme was that of the
inexorable march of progress. "The American version of progress has fitted an
extraordinary range of facts in the economic situation and in human nature." 1 65 Belief in
progress as automatic had blinded Americans. A stereotype like progress took on a
momentum of its own and limited America to employing superficial responses to
problems. Progressives advocated programs, butnot how they were to be implemented.
(Lippmann had done just that in Drift and Mastery) Laissez faire economics assumed the
economy went on under its own power. 1 66 Americans saw progress and success in
everything American; "We read back into the qualities that are presupposed in the
stereotypes." 167
Political campaigns used language, imagery, vagueness, and tropes to invoke
stereotypes. "A leader or an interest that can make itself master of current symbols is
master of the current situation." 1 68 Because knowledge was limited, "we choose between
trustworthy and untrustworthy reporters." The public couldn't be everywhere at all times.
Many citizens relied only on vague reports about what was going on in the world. Access
to information was dependent on income levels, others lacked curiosity. He argued that
women in particular were often restricted in the kind of information they received by the
social set to which they were born. "The Negroes and the foreign element" developed
their own social hierarchies that controlled information within those groups. The
individuals entrusted to act on behalf of governments, schools, newspapers, and churches
were subject to the same limitations. Therefore, those jnstitutions were unable to do much
165
1 66
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about "the more obvious failings of democracy, against violent prej udice, apathy, and
preference for the trivial as against the hunger for sideshows and three legged calves." 169
"The nation finds itself in the face of aggravated problems without any source of
information that it can really trust." So the public was left to process tainted data using
defective reasoning. It meant that public opinion was built upon indirect, unseen and
puzzling information about which no certain conclusions could be made. Lippmann' s
contention was that democracy had never been considered i n light of the distance
between images in people' s minds and what went on outside their minds. For Lippmann,
the dilemma only heightened the danger of expecting the public to be able to evaluate the
kinds of issues before them. He held out little hope that education could solve the
problem. For one thing, educators suffered from the same disability as all other citizens.
And for another, "education is a matter of years, the emergency a matter of hours." If
education was merely going to reinforce the way things had always been done, nothing
would change. Lippmann claimed education was ineffective in creating an engaged
citizenry because all it did was reinforce traditional attitudes. Dealing with the modern
world required more than simply teaching "morals, manners and patriotism." 1 7

0

If political science could develop new ways to inquire about the world, perhaps education
might be of some help. It might teach how to properly assess the basis of information, or
about the proper use of history, or to recognize the source of attitudes and stereotypes.
Then it might be possible that "the enormous, censoring, stereotyping, and dramatizing
apparatus can be liquidated." 1 7 1
169 Ibid. , 365.
1 70 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 925), 2 8 .
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In his review of Public Opinion John Dewey noted that he was particularly
impressed by Lippmann' s analysis of the problem of knowledge. It was a "more
significant statement than professional epistemological philosophers have managed to
give." 1 72 But Dewey thought that Lippmann "surrendered the case for the press to
easily," a piquant criticism of one who made his living as an editor and journalist. There
was in Dewey' s mind a hope that the press could be reformed and that it might get past
the sensational to doing the task it ought to be engaged, "treating news events in the light
of a continuing study and record of underlying conditions." 173
Lippmann argued there was another problem in addition to the epistomolgic
dilemma. Americans were too busy struggling with their own lives to be able to gather
and digest the data necessary to make the kinds of decisions required of an
"omnicompetent" citizen. There was no one in Lippmann' s experience who approached
the ideal of the "sovereign and omnicompetent citizen," an individual expected to possess
an "unlimited quantity of public spirit, interest, curiosity and effort." 174 "We are
concerned with public affairs," he wrote, "but immersed in our private lives." Time and
attention were limited. 1 75 Little time was spent on reading newspapers. Urban dwellers
had to cope with a "bath of noise." 1 76 The private citizen is something like a "deaf
spectator" Lippmann wrote, only recalling that he is affected by public affairs by the
intrusion of rules and regulations, taxes, and the occasional war. Public affairs were
1 72 Dewey, "Public Opinion, " 339. Some thirty-five years earlier Dewey had himself been involved in a
project with Franklin Ford and Robert Park intended to produce j ust such a paper, "Thought News." The
paper was never published and the project ended in "distressing" circumstances to Dewey. See Westbrook,
John Dewey and American Democracy, 56-58.
1 73 Dewey, "Public Opinion," 34 1 .
1 74 Lippmann, The Phantom Public, 22.
1 75 Lippmann, Public Opinion, 57.
1 76 Ibid., 72.
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invisible, managed in

far

off places, controlled by unfamiliar powers. 177 The citizen was

poorly informed, "he lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is
unable to direct. In the cold light of experience he knows that his sovereignty is a fiction.
.
. th eory, but m fact h e does not govern . " 178
He reigns m
.

Dewey agreed that the citizen was misunderstood, but he had a different
explanation, one that relied on the most basic assumption of pragmatism. Dewey argued
that individuals did not exist apart from social relations, nor did individuals possess rights
prior to the existence of society. Dewey' s analysis of the misapprehension of the nature
of the individual led him to different conclusions than Lippmann. Dewey put the blame
on a distorted liberalism that was in fact a philosophy of individualism. Dewey worked
from the origins of the United States. Instead of recognizing the contingent nature of the
American state, liberals now imagined democracy came from "some inalienable sacred
authority resident in protesting individuals." John Locke had prominently argued that
non-political rights were part of the very nature of the individual and that the proper role
of government was limited to the protection of those rights. 179 This account of
individualism was eventually supported by the study of economics as that discipline soon
claimed to be the study of natural laws. Economics became entwined with politics.
"Proof' that economics was based on a system of natural laws served to support the same
kind of claims about politics. It was a small step to the assertion that the sole purpose of
government was to protect economic interests. 1 80 This was an argument Dewey had
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made before, but the pro-business orientation of the administration in Washington only
served to reinforce his point.
Changes in material conditions resulted in a "release of human potentialities
previously dormant." What may have been unsettling to the community was "liberating
with respect to single persons." Individuals found themselves freed from old habits,
regulations, and institutions. Individualism and democracy developed side by side.
Voting and maj ority rule were portrayed as the acts of individuals "in their untrammeled
individual sovereignty." 1 8 1 But industrialization had ushered in a "new era of human
relationships." 1 82 Democratic political theory was built on a conception of independent,
self-motivated individuals, but what existed now were "standardized interchangeable
units." 1 83 Liberalism joined the mythology of an isolated individual possessing a "readymade faculty of foresight and prudent calculation" with the doctrine of individuals
possessing antecedent natural rights. 1 84 To Dewey this was rank nonsense. Classic
liberalism failed to recognize that the "underlying and generative conditions of concrete
behavior are social as well as organic." 1 85 Dewey' s conclusion regarding the "problem of
the public" was that the same forces which had created the forms of democratic
government had also brought about "conditions which halt the social and humane ideals
that demand the utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality of an inclusive
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and fraternally associated public." America had no political institutions worthy of it and
as a result the democratic public remained inchoate and unorganized. 1 86
Both men attempted to describe what the "public" really was and was not.
Lippmann claimed that theories regarding popular government were based on the
conception that "there is a public which directs the course of events." But in reality the
pubic was a "mere phantom." The public was not a fixed body, but rather consisted of
those persons who were interested in a particular affair at a particular time and could
affect it by supporting or rejecting the participants in that affair. "An opinion of the right
and the wrong, the good and the bad, the pleasant and unpleasant is dated, is localized, is
relative. It applies only to some men in some place under some circumstances." 1 87 Private
interests and relative values rarely merged into a common interest. The best that could be
hoped for was an "accommodation of purpose," something tantamount to balance of
power politics. 1 88 Conventional theory treated the public as if it were an organism, one
person with an organic unity. Liberalism' s treatment of the public as an organic
individual created profound confusion that could be eliminated only by recognizing that
"it i s the individual who acts, not society; it is the individual who thinks, not the
collective mind; it is the painter who paints, not the artistic spirit of the age; it is the
soldiers who fight and are killed, not the nation." 1 89 It was individuals interacting with
each other that constituted the public.
Lippmann believed that liberalism had demonstrated that man was part of the
natural world and that idea and custom were "bounded by time and space and
1 86
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circumstances" and that all opinion had a bias and the holders of those opinions could
only see the world from their vantage point, from their stereotypical perspective. 1 90
However, liberalism could never figure out what to do with this insight as it tried to
fashion a coherent public . The liberal approach was to try to tame and enlighten
individual interests and somehow have them fit together. But liberali sm offered no way
of overcoming individual interests. It made appeals to fairness; it provided a "weapon of
releas,e, but not a way of life." Liberalism consistently misjudged the capacity of the
public because it "assumed that all mankind was within hearing; that all mankind when it
heard would respond homogenously because it had a single soul." The liberal appeal to
the virtue in everybody "was equivalent to an appeal to nobody." 1 9 1 The appeal to a sense
of civic virtue could only be effective if made to actual individuals. Instead, liberalism
"attempted to eliminate the hero entirely." 192 Other theories of political and social order here Lippmann invoked Plato, Dante, Hamilton, Bismarck and Lenin - appealed to real
people in contrast to the "vague unworldliness" of liberalism. Liberalism's appeals
instead were "escapes from particular purposes into some universal purpose . . . a flight
from the human problem." 1 93
Dewey argued that American democracy had developed out of "genuine
community life" in stable locales. The founders attempted to create a government
appropriate for a "congeries of self governing communities." What Dewey' s age
inherited then, were ideals and practices designed for local town meetings modified
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circumstances demanded "mobile and fluctuating associational forms." Americans kept
moving. "How can a public," Dewey asked, "be organized when it literally does not stay
in place?" 1 95 Despite itself, and the lack of intelligent planning, America had achieved
some measure of political unity. The cost of national unity, however, was a lost and
bewildered public. As Lippmann had argued in A Preface to Politics twenty years earlier,
Dewey saw declining participation in elections as an indicator of the public ' s uncertainty.
Factions, "extra-legal agencies," and intermediary groups gained power. Citizens were
reduced to voting for unknown candidates, chosen by political machines. The public was
so "confused and eclipsed" that it was unable to grasp the mechanisms of government
ostensibly established for their use. Transformations in material and social relations had
so complicated matters that the public "cannot identify and distinguish itself." 196
Because the public was so disorganized, their representatives had little reason to respond
to social problems, which only amplified indifference and apathy. 1 97
Dewey went on to analyze the nature of the state. His emphasis was on the need
to understand the state as malleable, not an institution based on eternal principles. The
distinction between what was a public issue and what was private concern turned on an
analysis of the "scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need
control, whether by inhibition or promotion." 1 98 The public consisted of those affected by
the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it was "deemed necessary
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to have those consequences systematically cared for." 199 "The state" Dewey claimed, "is
the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests
shared by it members. " Because in no two ages or places did the same public exist, there
could be no "best" state. The formation of the state ought to be an experimental process .
As times changed so would the state; it must always be "rediscovered." 200 It was the job
of political and social science to devise methods for determining appropriate forms of the
political system. Belief in the sanctity of one system over another served was a barrier "to
orderly and directed change, an invitation to revolution."201
There would be no need for political organization if interactions were limited to
immediate face to face encounters in which consequences were "direct and vital." In a
neighborhood where each person knew the other, the state would be "an impertinence." 202
But industry and technology had altered forms of existing association. New material
conditions led to the formation of new publics, though those publics had no effective
recourse to political institutions because those institutions "persist of their momentum."
Old political structures had to be re-formed by the public itself. Successful political
organization could only be achieved through the "use of intelligence to judge
consequences." 203 Activities once thought of as private became public; others once public
became private. 204 The line between what public and private "has to be discovered
experimentally." It changed over time. "To suppose that an a priori conception of the
intrinsic nature and limits of the individual on one side and the state on the other will
1 99
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yield good results once and for all is absurd." 205 Dewey was arguing for at least the
possibility of state intervention in the economy, something that had been successful
during the war.
The public established "dikes and channels" to confine actions within prescribed
limits but their form did not come from a "general will" or any antecedent cause. Belief
that laws came from other sources than human agency inevitably led to replacement of
law with force. 206 Law was the structure which canalized action, intended to make
consequences predictable. Dewey went so far as to say that the nature of consequences
20
was "indifferent," what mattered was being able to predict consequences. 7 A public
organized as a state would have an interest in utilizing state apparatus to equalize
conditions. The dependent and helpless would become wards of the public. The state
would be involved in improving education and working conditions, establishing social
insurance, instituting a minimum wage
There was nothing perplexing or even discouraging in the "spectacle of the
stupidity and errors of political behavior." The state was as its officials were. Only
through constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials could citizens maintain the
integrity and usefulness of a state. 208 The measure of a state' s effectiveness was how
well it relieved individuals from the "waste of negative struggle and needless conflict and
confers upon him positive assurance and reinforcement in what he undertakes." 209 In the
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end, Dewey insisted, the state was to be judged by the consequences of its actions; it was
no more sacred than any other institution. 210
Lippmann claimed that the while the judgments of groups were often more
coherent than those proffered by individuals, groups could do nothing more than assent or
dissent to some proposition put before them2 1 1 No group ever cooperated in any complex
affair without some kind of central organization managed by a smaller cadre of people.
Advocates of direct democracy, as many of the Progressives had been, hypothesized
creative cooperation between self-sufficient individuals. But policies never developed
spontaneously in the "mind" of the public. 212 The contrast between men acting
individually and as a public had been misunderstood. The fundamental difference was
"between men doing specific things and men attempting to command general results." 21 3
What the public could do was approve of something which had to be done, or assent to
some proposal, "but they cannot create, administer and actually perform the act they have
in mind."2 1 4 The public could never be a part of the realm of executive acts. It would
always be confined to the role of controlling actions of others from the outside. The only
way the public had any influence was by influencing an actor in an affair, which meant
that the public had a secondary, indirect relationship to events. Public opinion was not a
force "directing society to clearly conceived ends." 215 Only during a crisis did public
opinion mean anything at all. In a crisis the public would align "in such a way as to favor
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the action of those individuals who may be able to compose the crisis." 216 But even here,
public opinion could only have an effect after "somebody" challenged the arbitrary power
first. Otherwise the public "can do nothing but meddle ignorantly or tyrannically." 217
Perhaps Lippmann' s most striking claim was that what appeared to be public
consent to policy was, in fact, manufactured consent. No longer were the people
sovereign, the purveyors of information had assumed that position. Techniques of
persuasion had been revolutionized: "It is no longer possible to believe in the original
dogma of democracy: that the knowledge needed for management of human affairs
comes from the human heart." 2 1 8 It was only a fiction concocted by political theorists,
Lippmann argued, that the functioning of government could ever be identified with the
will of the people.
Democratic theory ignored the fact that "people are fooled, that they do not
always know their own interests, and that all men are not equally fitted to govern." 219 The
political science on which democracy rested "assumed the art of government to be a
natural endowment." Jefferson believed the yeoman farmer possessed innately the
requisite qualities to participate in politics and at times even suggested the capacity to
govern rested in all the people (at least white people). Even someone like Alexander
Hamilton who had little faith in "the people," believed landholders, merchants and
professionals owned an instinct to govern. 220 To Lippmann all of this was dangerously
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absurd. What made it even more pernicious was that these "natural" rulers governed on
the basis of information that was incomplete. 221
If democracy were ever to exist as a spontaneous affair as Jefferson imagined it,
the interests of democracy would have had to remain simple and easily managed, the
environment within the range of every man ' s "direct and certain knowledge." 222 This
much Dewey could agree with. Trouble came when that democratic vision was applied to
the modem world, because the idealized citizen, competent to deal with public affairs,
selflessly concerned with the course of public affairs, consistently public spirited, was
nowhere to be found. The result was a bewildered public. Lippmann claimed (not very
convincingly) that his argument was not about "congenital differences between the
masterful few and ignorant many." 223 It was rather a matter of where men were placed in
relation to essential knowledge. Aristocrats and democrats made the same mistake; they
failed to acknowledge that "competence exists only in relation to function." 224
But, and this was the crux of Lippmann' s argument, it had never been proven that
a "public opinion" actually existed which could effectively be applied to any democratic
mechanism. It was folly to believe that every citizen wanted to or was competent to
participate actively in government. If the voter could not master the details of political
i ssues because he did not have the time, the interest, or the knowledge, he would not have
a more informed public opinion simply because he was asked to express his opinion more
often. Instead, the voter would be more bewildered, more bored and more ready to go
along uncritically:
221
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These various remedies, eugenic, educational, ethical, populist and socialist all
assume that either the voters are inherently competent to direct the course of
affairs or that they are making progress toward such an ideal. I think it is a false
ideal. I do not mean an undesirable ideal. I mean an unattainable ideal, bad only in
the sense that it is bad for a fat man to try to be a ballet dancer. An ideal should
express the true possibilities of its subject. When it does not it perverts the true
possibilities. The ideal of the omnicompetent, sovereign citizen is, in my opinion
such a false ideal. It is unattainable. The pursuit of it is misleading. The failure to
achieve it has produced the current disenchantment. 225

Problems that might have been solvable became intractable precisely because the public
exerted its force. What was left for the public in Lippmann' s scheme was the
determination of whether actors in a given controversy followed appropriate rules or
sought to satisfy their own arbitrary desires. 226 Political scientists could devise methods
of j udging whether the rules were followed. Civic education could inform the public
about the methods political scientists had developed. 227 That was it. "When we
remember,'' Lippmann wrote, "that the public consists of busy men reading newspapers
for half an hour or so a day" the prudent course of action was for the public not to get
22
involved in political issues at all. 8
Lippmann' s way out of the dilemma was reliance on experts. He argued that
reliance on experts was not evidence of "sheep-like nature." 229 It would be important to
consult a number of experts and they ought to be forced to answer to each other. 230
Lippmann did not have much to offer as to how one expert might be chosen over another.
It was a question "we need not try to enter,'' though Lippmann, curiously enough, seemed
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to feel the answer could be found in psychoanalysis. 23 1 He did not question the need to
publicly air the recommendations proposed by experts, but he thought it preposterous that
their deliberations would be comprehensible or even of interest to many citizens.
Dewey' s response was to consider whether management of political institutions
by experts would advance the cause of democracy. Non-political activities were all
directed by specialists, yet the political realm resisted their influence. Most public
concerns were technical matters : sanitation, public health, housing, city planning,
regulation and distribution of immigrants. Solutions to those kinds of problems could
only be achieved by factual inquiry, something other than counting votes. 23 2 But Dewey
was adamantly opposed to Lippmann' s proposal. Rule by experts was a "revival of the
Platonic notion that philosophers should be kings,'' though experts had replaced
philosophers because "philosophy has become something of a joke." 233 A cynic, Dewey
observed, might think that the whole expert plan was a "reverie entertained by the
intellectual class in compensation for an impotence." If the masses were indeed
"intellectually irredeemable" as claimed, possessed of both "too many desires and too
much power,'' they weren't going to permit rule by experts anyway. Their very ostensible
infirmities -- "ignorance, bias, frivolity, jealousy, instability"-- made them unlikely
candidates for passive submission to rule by intellectuals ; "rule by an economic class
may be disguised from the masses; rule by experts could not be covered up." 234
Dewey believed that expertise was appropriate in administration of narrowly
framed issues where general policy was already established. However, if experts shut
23 1 Ibid., 222.
23 2 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, 123.
233 Ibid., 204.
234 Ibid. , 205.
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themselves off from the public as they became a separate class, they would be "shut off
from the knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve."2 35 Popular
government served to educate in that it "forces a recognition that there are common
interests, even though the recognition of what they are is confused." Segregating a class
of experts would inevitably remove them from deliberation with the public. The expert
class would become "a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social
matters is not knowledge at all." No government by experts in which the "masses do not
have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy
managed in the interests of the few."
There was a role for experts though. "The essential need . . . is the improvement of
the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That i s the problem of
the public." Inquiry was something at which experts were most competent. Their
expertise was not in framing policy, but in discovery and publication of the facts upon
which inquiry depends. Once the facts were identified, would the public have the
intelligence to make the appropriate judgments? The talent required to make decisions of
that type were exaggerated in Dewey' s estimation. Until propaganda and secrecy were
replaced by inquiry, "We have no way of telling how apt for j udgment of social policies
the existing intelligence of the masses may be." Further, effective intelligence, was not an
"original innate endowment.'.' Rather, effective intelligence was dependent upon "the
education which social conditions effect." 23 6 Dewey envisioned a general rise in the level
of intelligence resulting from a more enlightened state of social affairs, "the notion that
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intelligence is a personal endowment or personal attainment is the great conceit of the
intellectual class." 237
Lippmann understood that there were those who argued "the cure for the evils of
democracy is more democracy," that all would be solved if only the popular will could be
focused and determined because the will of the people was wise and beneficent. It would
not work. Technical solutions, the sort Progressives had proposed - extensions of
suffrage, initiatives, referendums, recalls, direct primaries, elected j udiciary - would be
no more effective. 23 8 Lippmann knew his understanding of democracy differed radically
from those of active reformers who believed that the voter ought to be treated as a
"responsible man." Perhaps he had Dewey in mind:
It was believed that if only he could be taught more facts, if only he would take
more interest, if only he would read more and better newspapers, if only he would
listen to more lectures and read more reports, he would gradually be trained to
direct public affairs. The whole assumption is false. It rests upon a false
conception of public opinion and a false conception of the way the public acts. No
sound scheme of civic education can come of it. No progress can be made toward
this unattainable ideal. 23 9
To this point, the dialogue between Dewey and Lippmann had been on terrain that
Lippmann had chosen. Dewey had worked within the framework that Lippmann
established because he felt that Lippmann' s challenge to American democracy had to be
met. He considered Lippmann to be of his own "intellectual weight." 240 Dewey, the
"philosopher of democracy," knew that when Americans�thought of democracy they
thought first of political democracy, of voting, of government, and how well it responded.
He knew that his passionate advocacy of radical pervasive democracy would come to
237
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nothing if political democracy failed. Dewey was at something of a disadvantage; his
writing style was nothing like Lippmann' s . A sympathetic reader of The Public and Its
Problems called it "maddeningly obscure." 241 Lippmann was a master stylist: acerbic,
cutting, funny, relentless.
Dewey approached the subject of political democracy as he did most everything
else, as if it were a problem to solve, experimentally. He offered a method that might be
useful in developing a solution to the problems of politics in the 1920s. Lippmann on the
other hand had an answer, the answer. But it was a facile answer. It is always easier to
say no, it cannot be done. Most everybody that has ever been in a public place and looked
around has at one time or another said to themselves, "That's my peer? That is who is
going to make decisions that will affect my life?" Maybe the answer really was no, but
that was not something that Dewey was going to allow to go unchallenged. It must have
been infuriating at times to read Lippmann' s biting criticism of what Dewey had spent his
life defending. Doubly infuriating because so much of what Lippmann wrote had the ring
of truth. All Dewey had to do was look at the White House to see that. But to Dewey' s
credit he tried to meet Lippmann' s thrusts without resorting to platitudes and exhortations
of faith. Some of the time he and Lippmann were talking past each other, a measure of
how far they had come from their days in the Progressive era.
What is clear in their exchange is where each man believed he stood in relation to
America. Philosopher Michael Walzer has developed a taxonomy of social criticism. One
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sort of criticism is "disembodied." It comes from a "dispassionate stranger" or an
"estranged native" who displays "radical detachment." That type of critic portrays
himself as disinterested and dispassionate, "in, but not wholly of their society." The other
type of critic is the "connected," or the "local j udge." 242 There is no doubt into which
category Lippmann fit. He was the disembodied critic, a designation he would have been
proud to bear. It was a position th:;it served him well as a journalist and advisor to the
powerful. His distance often gave him a unique and advantageous position to make
j udgments. But as Walzer points out, it "presses its practitioners toward manipulation and
compulsion."243 This rings true of Lippmann too.
Dewey belongs in the connected critic class. His life' s work was devoted to
erasing divisions and barriers, at least the ones of which he was cognizant. There were
times when Dewey had a surprisingly tin ear. He could be cruel and vengeful. His
treatment of Randolph Bourne, both when Bourne was alive and after he died, was
particularly unfortunate. But the power of his vision for America is as powerful today as
it was eighty years ago.
Lippmann was finished in their exchange, but Dewey had more to say about
democracy. Dewey was on the offensive now. Lippmann had exaggerated the importance
of politics and political action and minimized the need and the potential of educating the
entire public in the process of democracy. "The difficulty is so fundamental," Dewey
wrote, "that it can be met only by a solution more fundamental than [Lippmann] has
242
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dared to give." Democracy was "a word of many meanings." One meaning, and "not the
most inspiring," was political. 244
Industrialization had created a "Great Society" distinguished by vast webs of
impersonal relationships. Simultaneously, industrial development "invaded and
disintegrated the small community of former times without generating a ' Great
Community. "' Traditional political and legal forms were not competent to deal with the
repercussions. The modem world was one where consequences were "felt rather than
perceived . . . suffered but not known." There were no state mechanisms to "canalize the
streams of social action and thereby regulate them . . . Hence the publics are amorphous
and unarticulated." Issues were too complex and intricate. "The social situation has been
so changed by the facts of an industrial age that traditional general principles have little
practical meaning." 245 The environment was transformed faster than the social ethos.
Beliefs and ideals seemed "thin and wavering" because they were not in tune with actual
conditions. The physical tools of communication had evolved, but thoughts and
aspirations consistent with this new age had not been created:
Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will
remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community. Our Babel
is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared
experience is impossible. 246
Here is where Dewey diverged so sharply from Lippmann. Public opinion was formed by
communication within a community. The sources of information mattered, but everyone
in community life had the capacity to utilize information if it became the subject of social
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intercourse. Dewey was proposing that conversation was the context for opinion, not
expertise, or science owned by a privileged aristocracy.
The democratic ideal was one that seemed at odds with the modem age. What had
been forgotten was that democracy was richer than any formal structure. Dewey argued
that if fully realized, democracy would affect "all modes of human association,'' the
family, the school, industry, religion. He knew the old adage, j ust as Lippmann did, that
the cure for the problems of democracy was more democracy. He rejected that nostrum,
just as Lippmann had, if it meant only the provision of more of the same. Dewey' s
answer was to return to the idea of democracy itself, an effort directed at "clarifying and
deepening our apprehension of it."247 None of the machinery of democracy was sacred;
machinery was designed to meet needs. Democracy was not itself "a mystic faith,'' not
the gift of an "overruling providence,'' but a "well-attested conclusion from historic
facts." 248 Democracy did not develop as an immanent idea unfolding or of some world
spirit moving towards a foreordained end. Rather it was the "outcome of a vast series of
adaptations and responsive accommodations, each to its own particular situation." 249
He believed the general trend was towards making the interest of the public "a more
supreme guide." The problem remained though - how was a "scattered, mobile and
manifold public" going to find itself and express its interests? This was the first step,
more crucial than tinkering with democratic forms. "The problem lies deeper; it is in the
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first instance an intellectual problem: the search for conditions under which the Great
.

.

S oc1ety may become th e Great Commumty. " 250
What then was democracy? Viewed from the individual ' s perspective, it was
possession of "a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the
activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the
values which the groups sustain." From the perspective of the group, it demanded
liberating the potential of members of the group consistent with the interests and goods
which were held in common. Every individual was a member of many groups. All were
"enriching and enriched" by participation in family life, industry and voluntary
associations. Democracy was not an alternative to other forms of associated life, "It is the
idea of community itself . . . The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its
implications, constitutes the idea of democracy." 25 1
The concepts associated with democracy - fraternity, liberty and equality - were
"hopeless abstractions" unless understood in association with communal life. If not
comprehended in that manner, equality became merely "a creed of mechanical identity"
impossible to realize; liberty became merely "independence of social ties" ending in
anarchy:
[Liberty] is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which
takes place only in rich and manifold association with others; the power to be an
individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way
the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each
individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated
action. It is equitable because it is measured only by need and capacity to utilize,
not by extraneous factors which deprive one in order that another may take and
have . . . Equali!Y does not signify that kind of mathematical or physical
250
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equivalence in virtue of which any one element may be substituted for another. It
denotes effective regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each,
irrespective of physical and psychological inequalities. It is not a natural
possession but is a fruit of the community when its action i s directed by its
character as a community. 252
Dewey recognized that associations might occur without thought, but their mere
existence did not mean the creation of community. True community recognized desired
ends which could only be realized through communication. Culture allowed for memory
and foresight, for calculation and planning, for reflective thought and action which
fostered the development of shared goals and ideals. 25 3 It was education ' s purpose to
bring young people within "the traditions, outlook and interests" which characterized a
community. "Everything which is distinctively human is learned." Foremost of the
lessons to be learned was "an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member
of a community." 254
He returned to what he considered the fundamental question: "What are the
conditions under which it is possible for the Great Society to approach more closely and
vitally the status of a Great Community, and thus take form in genuinely democratic
societies and state?" 255 Outdated concepts had to be discarded. First among them, was the
idea that each individual was born with the native capacity to participate in civic affairs.
Dewey took note of Lippmann' s "omnicompetent individual: competent to frame
policies, to judge their results; competent to know in all situations demanding political
action what is good for his own good, and competent to enforce his idea of good and the
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will to effect it against contrary forces." 256 He had no doubt that history had destroyed the
idea that an individual was competent in all situations to know what was in his best
interest and to know how best to achieve it. But what permits us, he asked, to assume that
statesmen had the special knowledge required for the effective organization of a
democratic public? Organization was a technical problem and the requisite expertise did
not yet exist. Only through the method and spirit of science would it be possible to
develop the appropriate skills for any member of the democratic community. 257
Properly informed public opinion required continuous and connected inquiry, "a
thing i s fully known only when it is published, shared, socially accessible." 25 8 There was
room for disagreement - even if competing policy proposals were based on the same set
of facts. But "genuinely public policy" could only be formed on the basis of knowledge
acquired through "systematic, thorough and well-equipped search." 259 Dewey' s
complaint was that the social sciences could not publish their findings quickly enough.
Rapid communication only promoted the dissemination of news, events that deviated
from the norm. But the meaning of the news depended on social consequences which
could only be determined in context. 260 The days were past when government could be
carried on without any pretense of determining public wishes. Thus "there is an enormous
premium upon all methods which affect their formation."261
Would it really matter, Dewey asked, if inquiry were perfected? Would the public
be interested in the results? He had a surprising response. The public would be interested
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only if the art of presentation were perfected. "The freeing of the artist in literary
presentation . . . i s as much a precondition of the desirable creation of adequate opinion on
public matters as is the freeing of social inquiry." 262 Here Dewey was arguing for the
importance of art in democracy. "The function of art has always been to break through
the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness . . . Artists have always been the
real purveyors of news." 263 Sharing socially available knowledge would "directly and in
unpredictable ways" alter the working of human nature. New potentialities would be
released; none of them predictable. 264 Education needed to be improved and scientific
inquiry into the development of children pursued. More money needed to be spent on
understanding the causes of mental illness and retardation. Improved techniques might
lead to control over abnormal behavior. 265 Ultimately the substitution of experiment for
"absolutistic logic" would mean that "no longer will views generated in view of special
situations be frozen into absolute standards and masquerade as eternal truths."266
Dewey was restrained regarding the chance that American democracy could be
reformed. "In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of
face-to-face intercourse. That is why the family and neighborhood, with all their
deficiencies, have always been the chief agencies of nurture." The Great Community, in
the sense of free and full communication was possible, but it could never possess all the
qualities that marked a local community. The best that could be hoped for was that the
larger community would be competent to order relations and enrich the experience of the
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264
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smaller, more localized community. 267 "There is something deep within human nature
itself which pulls toward settled relationships," Dewey wrote. "Happiness which is full of
content and peace is found only in enduring ties with others." He wondered if the "mania
for motion, of fretful discontent" were only attempts at filling the vacuum left by the
breakdown of community ties. The rise of cities, the concentration of wealth, rather than
promoting social bonds, only abetted the "demolition of ties that form local
communities." He concluded that there was no way to predict either the development or
further decline of community. One thing was certain in Dewey' s mind, "Unless local
communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent
problem: to find and identify itself." Democracy depended on it. 26 8
There is something troubling about Dewey' s nostalgic evocation of the small
face-to-face community of some distant past. Omitted from Dewey' s vision is any
acknowledgement that there had always been some left out or relegated to the margins.
Lippmann had made a point to consider the move towards fuller equality of women,
albeit not in a completely satisfactory manner. Lippmann had at least mentioned racial
inequity. Perhaps Dewey felt that democratic education and reorganization would
automatically bring racial minorities into community, but if he did, he never wrote about
it. 269 His comments regarding the position of women were limited too. 270 Dewey
267
26 8

Ibid., 2 1 1 .
Ibid., 2 1 3- 14.

269 Dewey' s failure to address the plight o f African-Americans through the course o f his life is really
surprising. In 1 909, he gave a speech at Cooper Union in response to "The Call." That may be a testament
to Mary White Ovington' s persistence. Daniel Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois ' s biographer, thinks that
Du Bois probably wrote the speech which takes up less than two pages in Dewey' s collected works. David
Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois - Biography of a Race, 1868-1919 (NY: Hemy Holt, 1 993), 300.The
speech was found in the archives of the NAACP, not Dewey' s papers. Dewey never wrote of lynching or
racial discrimination or segregation. There are virtually no mentions of race in the thirty-seven volumes of
his Collected Works, nor in his correspondence. In 1 932 he spoke at the NAACP' s 23rd annual convention.
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certainly wasn' t a racist, but African-Americans seemed outside his purview. Nor did it
seem he had taken account of how often those small communities demanded stifling
conformity, an observation made that had long ago been made by Tocqueville.
That being said, there are passages in The Public and its Problems of
incomparably intense emotional power. There is beauty amidst the "maddeningly
obscure." Granted, there are not many hints revealed on how to get to the "Great
Community." But to see Dewey' s portrait of an active, engaging, emotionally fulfilling
democratic community next to Lippmann' s sterile, expertly organized, republican society
is to make the choice between them easy. Perhaps that is a judgment of the heart over the
head.
There were only limited interactions between the two men after 1926. In 1 930,
Dewey wrote to Lippmann:
It was very good of you to write me about my last book. On the whole, I find
more satisfaction, and certainly consolation, in the comments of those who, like
yourself, are not engaged in the work of philosophy professionally, than I do from
the reactions of some, at least, of my colleagues. 27 1
He minimized the role of racism and instead ascribed discrimination to economic considerations. In the
months prior to the convention, Du Bois had written Dewey four letters asking him to write something for
the The Crisis, but Dewey only responded to the last. Unfortunately Dewey' s response has never been
located. Du Bois responded to the last, saying that he understood and invited Dewey to respond whenever
he could. That Du Bois persisted says something I suppose. (Dewey's papers are housed at the Center for
Dewy Studies at Southern Illinois University.)
·

270

Dewey' s relationship with Jane Addams was one of the most important of his life. To his credit, he
treated Addams as he would any of the other intellectual giants he was acquainted with. It does not seem to
me that her influence on him did not have much to do with gender issues. Charlene Haddock Siegfried, a
superb scholar of pragmatism, makes a convincing case that pragmatism is a powerful analytic and
organizing principle for feminism. B ut she is a lot less convincing when she tries to demonstrate that
Dewey expressed a direct concern for gender. Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social
Fabric. See also Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 1 67 fn 1 3 .
271
Dewey to Lippmann, 14 January 1 930, Lippmann Papers, Yale Sterling Library. It is uncertain which of
Dewey's books he was referring to, though it most likely was The Quest for Certainty.
Though Lippmann graduated from Harvard, his papers are housed at Yale' s Sterling Library. There are
only a limited number of items of correspondence between Dewey and Lippmann in the archives. Dewey' s
papers d o not contain any additional items. Over the course o f the years, they exchanged occasional letters,
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Dewey wrote another letter in 1 94 1 , this one not to Lippmann but to James T.
Farrell, the novelist: "I can't but feel that L' s devotion now to classical learning and the
Great Tradition is another case of Jewish inferiority compensatory reaction . . . About
Lippmann - it would be hard to find a more egregious example of concocted
ignorance. " 272
In 1 937 John Dewey reviewed Walter Lippmann' s The Good Society which had
been published that year. Dewey was harsh in his criticism. Lippmann had "give[n]
encouragement and practical support to reactionaries . . . because the picture he draws of
Liberalism is in terms of an idealistic Utopia." 273 The Good Society ignored the means
that would be required to achieve the ends Lippmann had in mind. Lippmann' s argument
rested on "an extremely abstract simplification." Lippmann, Dewey wrote "has stated the
legalistic and the lawyer' s conception of human relations better than any lawyer I know
of has stated it." Most striking is this comment: "Lippmann, like many other wellintentioned persons, is strong for government by law rather than by men . . . "
In 1 9 1 2 Lippmann had written something quite different, "Jealous of all individuals,
democracies have turned to machines. They have tried to blot out human prestige, to
minimize the influence of personality . . . Governments have to be carried on by men,
however much we distrust them."27

4

always respectful and formal, offering advice regarding publishers, enlisting assistance, passing along
requests for contributions to various organizations, expressing appreciation for providing and publishing
articles, praising each other for an occasional essay.
272 John Dewey to James T. Farrell , February 18, 1 94 1 (Dewey papers Morris Library, Southern Illinois
University), quoted in Diggins, "From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann's Quest for the
Foundation of Legitimacy," 534.
273 John Dewey, "Liberalism in a Vacuum: A Critique of Walter Lippmann's Social Philosophy, " review of
An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society, by Walter Lippmann, Common Sense 6 ( 1937) : 489.
274 Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 16.
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They had traveled quite a distance in twenty-five years.

Andrew J. Bacevich is Professor of History and International Relations at Boston
University, a graduate of West Point and a veteran of the Vietnam War. Bacevich i s the
author of The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. 275 His
cautionary message regarding America' s dangerous fixation on military power is
especially convincing, coming as it does from a former officer and self-described
conservative. He spoke out against the Iraq War before it began. He continues to be an
eloquent opponent to the American occupation of Iraq and of the Bush administration ' s
approach to foreign policy.
On May 1 3 , 2007, his 27 year old son, an Army 1st Lieutenant, was killed in Iraq.
On May 27, 2007, his essay, "I Lost My Son to a War I Oppose," was published
in the Washington Post. As a citizen, he wrote, he had tried to promote a critical
understanding of U.S. foreign policy in books, and articles, and in talks to groups, both
large and small.
Not for a second did I expect my own efforts to make a difference. But I did hope
that my voice might combine with those of others - teachers, writers, activists and
ordinary folks - to educate the public about the folly of the course on which the
nation has embarked. I hoped that those efforts might produce a political climate
conducive to change.
This I can now see, was an illusion.
Bacevich went on:
The people have spoken, and nothing of substance has changed. The November
2006 midterm elections signified an unambiguous repudiation of the policies that
275

Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005 ) .
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landed us in our predicament. But half a year later, the war continues, with no end
in sight. Indeed, by sending more troops to Iraq (and by extending the tours of
duty of those, like my son, who were there already), Bush has signaled his
complete disregard for what was once quaintly referred to as the "will of the
people."276

Eighty years after Walter Lippmann and John Dewey confronted the future of
American democracy we have come to this. Education, preci sely the sort that Dewey had
in mind, education intended to transform the habits and attitudes of the American
citizenry, has failed. Walter Lippmann assured us, that if nothing else (and for him, there
was nothing else), at least the American public had the wherewithal to vote no, and its
voice would be heard. That too is a failed promise.
How have we let this happen?

276

Andrew J. Bacevich, "I Lost My Son to a War I Oppose. We Were Both Doing Our Duty, " Washington
Post, May 27, 2007 2007.
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